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THE GEOMETRY OF PREPOSITION MEANINGS
ABSTRACT: This article presents a unified approach to the se-
mantics of prepositions based on the theory of conceptual spaces.
Following the themes of my recent book The Geometry of Meaning,
I focus on the convexity of their meanings and on which seman-
tic domains are expressed by prepositions. As regards convex-
ity, using polar coordinates turns out to provide the most natural
representation. In addition to the spatial domain, I argue that
for many prepositions, the force domain is central. In contrast to
many other analyses, I also defend the position that prepositions
have a central meaning and that other meanings can be derived
via a limited class of semantic transformations.
1. PROGRAM
The aim of this article is to present a unified approach to the semantics
of prepositions based on the theory of conceptual spaces (Gärdenfors
2000, 2014).1 In most languages, prepositions form a closed class with
a limited number of representatives. However, they are often used for
a wide range of meanings. This semantic flexibility makes it difficult
to provide an exhaustive analysis of their semantics. The linguistic lit-
erature on prepositions is extremely rich, and I have no ambition to
do it justice. In this article, I focus on the convexity of their meanings
and on which domains are expressed by prepositions. I argue that for
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many prepositions, the force domain is central. In contrast to many
other analyses, I also defend the position that prepositions have a cen-
tral meaning and that other meanings can be derived via a limited class
of semantic transformations.
2. THE SEMANTICS OF PREPOSITIONS
Before I begin my semantic analysis I must present two technical con-
cepts. The first is the notion of a domain (Gärdenfors & Löhndorf 2013;
Gärdenfors 2014). Conceptual spaces (Gärdenfors 2000, 2014) are
constructed out of quality dimensions. Examples are pitch, tempera-
ture, weight, size, and force. The primary role of the dimensions is to
represent various “qualities” of objects in different domains. Some di-
mensions come in bundles — what I call domains — for example, space
(which has dimensions of height, width, and depth); color (hue, satu-
ration, and brightness); taste (salty, bitter, sweet and sour, and maybe
a fifth dimension); emotion (arousal and value); and shape (where the
dimensions are not well known).
The second is the notion of convexity. That a region R is convex
means that for any two points x and y in R, all points between x and
y are also in R. The motivation for applying betweenness to represent
concepts in a conceptual space is that, if some objects located at x and
y in relation to some domain are both examples of a concept, then any
object that is located between x and y with respect to the same domain
will also be an example of that concept.
Most prepositions can be grouped into two classes: locative, indicat-
ing where something is, and directional, indicating where something is
going. Locative prepositions modify a noun (noun phrase) by specifying
a location (a region) in the visuospatial domain.
The following thesis is the central claim of this article:2
Single-domain thesis for prepositions: Prepositions represent convex sets
of points or paths in a single domain.
As I will show, locative prepositions are represented by sets of points
and directional prepositions by sets of paths.
The claim is that each use of a preposition builds on a single domain,
but it is not required that all uses are based on the same domain. For
example, I will argue that most typical uses of the prepositions “over,”
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“on,” and “in” depend on the force domain. However, there are com-
mon metaphorical transformations of meanings that bring these prepo-
sitions into the visuospatial domain. As a matter of fact, metaphorical
uses of prepositions are ubiquitous. Nevertheless, I will argue that for
each preposition there is a central meaning that depends on a primary
domain.
3. SPATIAL REPRESENTATION USING POLAR COORDINATES
3.1. Polar Coordinates and Convexity
To model the meaning of prepositions, I need to make some assump-
tions about how to model the visuospatial domain. Normally this do-
main is represented with the aid of the Cartesian coordinates x, y, and
z, representing width, depth, and height, and where distances are mea-
sured using a Euclidean metric. However, another way of representing
space may be cognitively more realistic, namely, in terms of polar co-
ordinates, which represent points in space in terms of distance and an-
gles. Cognitively, a polar representation of space is more natural than a
Cartesian one, since our visuospatial perceptual system is made for es-
timating directions and distances from ourselves rather than estimating
distances between two points outside us. We are so influenced in our
culture by Euclidean geometry, Cartesian coordinate systems, Newto-
nian mechanics, and Kantian a priories that we have difficulties seeing
that there are other ways of describing spatial perception.
I start with a three-dimensional space S defined in terms of polar
coordinates. It is assumed that the space has an origo point o. A point
p is represented as a triple <r, φ,θ> where:
r (the radius) is a real number (with r ≥ 0) representing the distance
of p from the origo;
φ (the azimuth angle) is the angle (with 0° ≤ φ < 360°) between p and
the “north” axis, perpendicular to the zenith (the azimuth);
θ (the polar angle) is the angle (with 0° ≤ θ ≤ 180°) between p and
the “upward” axis (the zenith).
Following common practice in the use of polar coordinates, two abso-
lute frames of reference are already built into the polar coordinates,
namely, the zenith (up) and the azimuth (north), as the fixed reference
directions relative to which other angles are defined. (In most cases,
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the upward direction is determined by gravitation.) Notice that when
the polar angle is 0°or 180°, then the value of φ is arbitrary. We assume
that the angle φ goes clockwise when seen from above, so that east is
90°and west is 270°.
Given the representation of polar coordinates, I can define a notion
of polar betweenness that is different from the one generated by the
standard Euclidean metric:
A point b =< xb,φb,θ b> lies polarly between a point a =< xa,φa,θ a>
and a point c =< x c,φc,θ c > if there is some k, 0 < k < 1 such that
xb = kxa+(1−k)x c,φb = kφa+(1−k)φc iff |φa−φc| ≤ 180°, and φb =
kφa+(1−k)(φc−360°) iff |φa−φc|> 180°, and θ b = kθ a+(1−k)θ c.
The azimuth angle also takes on values greater than 180°, but be-
tweenness is defined with respect to the smallest angle.
The polar coordinates introduce a different metric on the space,
compared with the standard Euclidean metric. Consequently the “lines”
generated by this polar betweenness relation will be “curved,” if seen
with Euclidean glasses.3 This is illustrated in figure 1 for three vectors
between the vectors a =<1,0°> and c =<2,90°>. These vectors are
between, because their radiuses are between those of a and c, and at
the same time their angles are between those of a and c.
Figure 1. Polar betweenness.
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A region R in S is then defined to be polarly convex if and only if for
all points a and b in R, any point c that is polarly between a and b is
also in R.
One thing to note about this definition, in comparison to Euclidean
convexity, is under what coordinate transformations convexity is pre-
served. Euclidean convexity is preserved under multiplications, transla-
tions, and rotations of the coordinate system. In contrast, polar convex-
ity only preserves convexity under multiplications (changing the values
of the r-axis) and rotations (changing the values of the φ- and θ -axes).
If a translation occurs, that is, if the origo moves, then convexity may
not be preserved. It should also be noted that the only polarly convex
set that allows both unrestricted multiplication and unrestricted rota-
tion is the full space. The relevance of this will be apparent later.
In this context, Talmy (2000, chap. 1) proposes a topology principle
that “applies to the meanings — or schemas — of closed-class forms re-
ferring to space, time, or certain other domains.” This principle, which
he claims is a language universal, says that distance, size, shape, or
angle from such schemas play no role for the meaning of these forms.
He illustrates with the preposition “across,” which “prototypically rep-
resents motion along a path from one edge of a bounded plane to its
opposite. But this schema is abstracted away from magnitude. Hence,
the preposition can be used equally well in ‘The ant crawled across my
palm,’ and in ‘The bus drove across the country.’ Apparently, no lan-
guage has two different closed-class forms whose meanings differ only
with respect to magnitude for this or any other spatial schema.”
3.2. Motion along Paths
The previous section introduced the formalism for representing the lo-
cation of a trajector in terms of one vector. If a trajector is moving or if
it is extended in shape, then the notion of a path is needed (see, e.g.,
Jackendoff 1983; Talmy 2000; Eschenbach et al. 2000; Zwarts 2005;
and many others). There are different ways to represent a path, but I
adopt the more common way of representing it as a directed curve, that
is, as a continuous function p from the real interval [0,1] to S. The val-
ues of the interval [0,1] do not represent moments of time, but they are
an ordering mechanism. What is important is that the path represents
“locations in sequence,” so to say.
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The starting point of a path p can be denoted as p(0), the endpoint
as p(1), and for any i ∈ (0,1), p(i) is an intermediate point. All of these
will be points that are represented in terms of polar coordinates. It will
be convenient later to refer to these coordinates in the following ways:
radius(p(i)) is the radius of the path p at i;
polar(p(i)) is the polar angle of p at i;
azimuth(p(i)) is the azimuth angle of p at i.
I also assume that the path is simple, that is, it does not cross itself. This
can be defined by saying that for all i and j, p(i) 6= p(j).
4. LOCATIVE PREPOSITIONS
A preposition describes a relation between a trajectory and a landmark
(“between” is an exception, since it involves a relation between a trajec-
tor and two landmarks). The landmark will usually not be point sized,
but it will occupy an extended region of space. I assume a function loc
that assigns a subset loc(x) ⊆ S as a region to every convex object x. For
convenience, I often simply designate this region as x and refer to it as
“landmark”.
When we judge the relation between a trajectory and a landmark,
the center of the landmark will function as the origo of S. To keep the
mathematics from becoming too complicated, I consider only convex
regions and restrict the analysis to circular landmarks with the origo in
the center. It is an idealization that all landmarks have this shape, but
for the meanings of the locative prepositions, this idealization does not
result in any major deviations.
4.1. Regions for Locative Prepositions
I now show that by using polar coordinates, locative prepositions can be
given a highly systematic description that brings out more explicitly the
spatial features of each preposition. A basic distinction in the system of
prepositions is between internal and external regions, corresponding to
the prepositions “inside” and “outside,” respectively. These regions can
be defined as sets of points, where r is the radius of the landmark. For
simplicity’s sake, these regions are restricted to the horizontal plane by
including only the horizontal angle in the coordinates.
inside: {< x ,φ>: x < r}
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outside: {< x ,φ>: x > r}
The corresponding regions can be diagrammed by shading the area
where the endpoints of the vectors are (see Figure 2).
Figure 2. Inside and outside regions.
The three coordinates of a polar system provide three ways of dividing
the space outside a landmark. The first is distance from a landmark (the
x-coordinate). A first distinction is to divide the space into points that
are near or far (see Figure 3). Of course, at what distance the division
is made depends on the context, in particular the size of the landmark:
what is near the sun in space covers a much larger distance than what
is near a golf ball on the ground. Moreover, the division is not sharp
but might allow for a vague gap between near and far.
Figure 3. Near and far regions.
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The denotations of near and far can be given in the following way as
sets of located polar coordinates, for a given landmark region with ra-
dius r and a contextually given norm c for distance.
near: {< x ,φ>: r < x < c}
far: {< x ,φ>: c < x}
Working in the horizontal plane are prepositions like “in front of,” “be-
hind,” “beside,” “to the left of,” and “to the right of,” and the cardi-
nal directions “north of,” “west of,” “south of,” and “east of.” Much has
been written about the different frames of reference that are used here,
with different terminologies, such as egocentric and allocentric, rela-
tive and absolute, object-centered and viewer-centered (Levinson 1996;
Bohnemeyer 2012). I follow the terminology of Levinson. The cardinal
prepositions use an absolute frame of reference, directly tied to the fixed
(north) reference direction of φ. The other prepositions use either an
intrinsic frame of reference (based on features of the landmark itself)
or a relative frame of reference (based on the position of an observer).
I restrict the analysis to the intrinsic frame of reference by assuming
that some angle f ∈ φ is assigned to a landmark x that represents the
front direction of loc(x). This results in a number of “focal” directions
from x in the horizontal plane, namely, f , b = f + 180°, r = f + 90°,
l = f − 90°. The regions for the prepositions can then be defined in
terms of closeness to these focal directions, leading to borders that are
vague and partially dependent on context:
in front of : {< x ,φ>: r < x and φ is close to f }
behind: {< x ,φ>: r < x and φ is close to b}
to the left of : {< x ,φ>: r < x and φ is close to l}
to the right of : {< x ,φ>: r < x and φ is close to r}
If the prepositions partition the horizontal angle into four regions,
then this would look as in Figure 4.
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Figure 4. In front of, behind, to the left of, and to the right of as regions
of the angle φ around a landmark.
The preposition “beside” could be seen as the union of “left of” and
“right of,” but it seems to have an extra element of proximity, which
is lacking in the other horizontal prepositions. For the time being, I
assume that “beside” covers angles of φ that are close to f ± 90°, but I
take a closer look at “beside” in the next subsection.
Figure 5. The region for beside.
I next turn to the preposition “between,” which is, in its most promi-
nent use, based on two landmarks (Habel 1989; Van der Zee & Watson
2004). In this case, the reference angle is determined by the line be-
tween the two landmarks. Each landmark can be seen as generating a
cone going in the direction of the other landmark. The region repre-
senting “between” can then be defined as the set of points that belong
to both cones.
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Figure 6. The region for between.
The third division concerns the altitude coordinate θ that can be
used to determine the regions for the prepositions “above” and “below.”
(I compare these to “over” and “under” in section 6.) The “prototypi-
cal” directions are 0° (straight up) and 180° (straight down). “Above”
corresponds to values of θ that are close to 0°, and “below” corresponds
to values that are close to 180° (see Figure 7, which should be seen as
a two-dimensional cross section of the regions). Again, how close the
values should be depends on the context and is a matter of vagueness.
The prototypical meanings of the prepositions lie on the vertical axis.
Figure 7. Above and below as regions.
The following definitions give us such regions for a landmark with
radius r, given the appropriate notion of closeness:
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above: {<x,φ,θ >: x > r,θ is close to 0°}
below: {<x,φ,θ >: x > r,θ is close to 180°}
In summary, dividing the space into regions along the three polar coor-
dinates generates the regions for most of the common locative preposi-
tions in a natural way, by imposing simple conditions on the magnitude
of coordinates.
4.2. Convexity of Locative Prepositions
Given the notion of polar betweenness, the question is now whether re-
gions of locative prepositions are polarly convex. The answer is clearly
affirmative for the regions of the “angular” prepositions in the horizon-
tal plane, namely, the ones that have one single “cone” or halfspace: “in
front of,” “behind,” “to the left of,” “to the right of,” “north of,” “above,”
“below,” and so on. They are all polarly convex according to the defini-
tion. Since intersections of convex regions are also convex, “between”
satisfies the convexity principle. The reasoning is as follows. If the
“cones” of the two landmarks are already convex, then the region that
we create by intersecting these two regions (given the appropriate no-
tion of intersection for regions of polar coordinates) will not create any
discontinuities that violate convexity. It can be noted that the regions
for all these prepositions are all closed under multiplication along the
r-axis, but not under rotation.
Next consider “outside,” “near,” and “far,” which prima facie seem
problematic for convexity, because there is a gap in the center of the
region, where the landmark is, for all three prepositions, and, for “far,”
the area that is near the landmark. If position a to the east of my house
is outside (near, far) and a position b to the west is outside (near, far),
then there are definitely positions in between that may not be outside
(near, far). But this description depends on Euclidean betweenness. If
polar betweenness is applied to these regions, then they are convex.
The curved nature of the line between two points a and b leads around
the gap in the middle. Hence a point in the middle of a to the east
and b to the west is a point either to the north or to the south. This is
illustrated in Figure 8.
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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Figure 8. Polar betweenness ‘around’ a gap.
Similarly, “inside” is straightforward, given the idealizing assump-
tion about landmarks I have made. Note also that, in contrast to the
previous class of prepositions, the regions for “outside,” “inside,” “near,”
and “far” are all closed under rotations, but not under multiplication.
I am left then with the convexity of the preposition “beside.” A nat-
ural description is that the value of the angle φ of the vector going from
the landmark does not deviate considerably from either the left (-90°)
or the right (+90°) direction of y. In Figure 5, it seems that this set
of vectors consists of two separate sets, which would then violate the
convexity requirement. One conclusion might be that “beside” is in fact
a nonconvex preposition, maybe because it has a disjunctive definition:
vectors that are close to +90°or to -90°. While intersections of convex
regions are convex, unions are not necessarily so. However, another
conclusion might be that I have misanalysed “beside.”
Are there ways to analyze it as convex? One possibility would be
to say that “beside” covers all the horizontal directions, but its use for
the forward and backward direction is preempted or blocked by the
prepositions “in front of” and “behind.” Another possibility would be
to restrict “beside” to just one side at a time, as if we are saying “at a
side.”4
In fact, there are not many complex prepositional phrases that vi-
olate convexity, only some artificial cases like “diagonally above” and
“exactly one or exactly two meters above.” Even run-of-the-mill modi-
fied cases like “two feet above” or “far outside” are convex (given our
assumptions about landmarks). Not only basic prepositions are con-
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vex, but even many of the complex ones. This means that convexity
gains additional support as a general semantic constraint for locational
prepositions. Of course, the principle should also be analyzed cross-
linguistically, but that is beyond the scope of this article.
5. DIRECTIONAL PREPOSITIONS
I now consider prepositions that are used to express how a trajector
moves relative to a landmark, which are the subject of much study (a
recent example is Pantcheva 2010). They include the following:
goal prepositions: to, into, onto, toward
source prepositions: from, out of, off, away from
route prepositions: through, over, along, around, across
In addition, it is possible to get directional readings for locative prepo-
sitions:
goal: (to go) under, behind, . . .
source: (to come) from under, from behind, . . .
route: (to pass) under, behind, . . .
The source needs to be marked by the source preposition “from,” while
the possibility of a goal or route interpretation depends very much on
the verb and other factors (see, e.g., Gehrke 2008; Nikitina 2008).
5.1. Representing Directional Prepositions as Sets of Paths
Most of the directional prepositions can be represented as imposing a
locative condition on a particular part of the path, for instance, on the
endpoint (goal) or starting point (source). Stricter and weaker defini-
tions are possible, as discussed in Zwarts (2005), but here I use defi-
nitions that only involve opposite conditions on the starting point and
endpoint:
Goal prepositions
to = {p: near(p(1)) and not near(p(0))}
into = {p: inside(p(1)) and not inside(p(1))}
(to) behind = {p: behind(p(1)) and not behind(p(0))}
Source prepositions
from = {p: near(p(0)) and not near(p(1))}
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out of = {p: inside(p(0)) and not inside(p(1))}
from behind = {p: behind(p(0)) and not behind(p(1))}
Route prepositions
by, past = {p: not near(p(0)), not near(p(1)), and there is an i ∈ (0,1)
such that near(p(i))}
through = {p: not inside(p(0)), not inside(p(1)), and there is an
i ∈ (0,1) such that inside(p(i))}
(via) behind = {p: not behind(p(0)), not behind(p(1)), and there is an
i ∈ (0,1) such that behind(p(i))}
Other prepositions compare the endpoint with the starting point:
toward = {p: radius(p(1)) < radius(p(0)) and for all i ∈ [0,1]
radius(p(i)) > r}
away from = {p: radius(p(0)) < radius(p(1)) and for all i ∈ [0,1]
radius(p(i)) > r}
I next come to a class of directional prepositions that are at a level
of greater complexity than the others, namely, “around,” “across,” and
“along.” Notice that these are also morphologically complex, derived
from expressions of shape or orientation like “round,” “cross,” “long.”
What is different from the other route prepositions is that they are spec-
ified not in terms of a location at a particular point of the path but in
terms of the shape or orientation of the path as a whole. Around paths
are round in some sense, across paths are orthogonal to the main axis
of the landmark, along paths parallel.
I have to set aside “across” and “along,” because they involve land-
marks that are elongated, which goes beyond my simple model of the
landmark as a region around an origin. This leaves “around,” which is a
preposition with a wide range of meanings (Zwarts, 2003). A very strict
interpretation of “around” (restricted to the horizontal plane) takes it
as corresponding to a full and perfect circular path:
around = {p: there is an r > 0 and an α ∈(0°,360°), such that p(i) =
(r,α± iφ)}
5.2. Convexity of Directional Prepositions
It is not obvious how to define betweenness for path. If I focus on
simple paths that are defined as mappings from the interval [0,1] to
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points <x,φ> in the horizontal surface, there is a solution that follows
the standard definition: Let p1(i) and p2(i), where 0 ≤ i ≤ 1, be two
functions mapping onto <x1(i),φ1(i)> and <x2(i),φ(i)> respectively.
Then the path p3(i) is said to be polarly between p1(i) and p2(i), if and
only if there is some k, 0 ≤ k ≤ 1, such that for all i, 0 ≤ i ≤ 1, p3(i) =
<x3(i),φ3(i)> = k<x1(i),φ1(i)> + (1 - k) <x2(i),φ2(i)>.
Given these definitions, it is easy to prove that the meanings of the
goal prepositions are convex. Convexity for “into” and “out of” follows
from the convexity of the points in the landmark, which I have assumed
to be convex. Similarly, the convexity of “to” follows from the fact that
the region for “near” is convex. To be precise, if p1(i) and p2(i) are
two paths such that near(p1(1)) and near(p2(1)), then for any path
p3 between p1 and p2, it will also hold that near(p3(1)). An analogous
argument holds for “from,” and similar arguments can be made for “(to)
behind” and “from behind,” since the region for “behind” is convex.
The convexity of “toward” is easy to prove: if p1(i) and p2(i) are
two paths such that radius(p1(1)) < radius(p1(0)) and for all i ∈ [0,1]
radius(p1(i))> r, and radius(p2(1))< radius(p2(0)) and for all i∈ [0,1]
radius(p2(i)) > r, then for any path p3 between p1 and p2, it will also
hold that radius(p3(1))< radius(p3(0)) and for all i∈ [0,1] radius(p3(i)
> r. An analogous argument shows that “away from” is convex.
Our way to handle route prepositions is to view them as sequences
of two conjoined paths: by or past a landmark means that the first path
goes near the landmark, and the second path goes away from the land-
mark; through a landmark means that the first path goes into the land-
mark, and the second path goes out of the landmark; and going behind
a landmark means that the first path goes to behind the landmark, and
the second path goes from behind the landmark. Given these descrip-
tions, the convexity of the route prepositions follows essentially from
the convexity of the set of points that conjoin the two paths, by analogy
with the convexity for the goal prepositions. A point conjoining two
paths p and q is a point for which p(1) = q(0). It is interesting to note
that with the definition of betweenness for paths, conjoining paths pre-
serves convexity: If P and Q are convex sets of paths and P•Q is the set
of conjoinings of paths from P and Q, then P•Q is convex too.
I finally turn to the convexity of “around.” The corresponding sets
of paths are not polarly convex. Take the “around” paths p1 and p2 that
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have the same radius r = 1 and the same starting angle α = 0°but go
in opposite directions (clockwise versus counterclockwise). Consider
now a path p3 that also has a radius r = 1 and an angle that is always
exactly halfway between the angles of p1 and p2. This path is not an
around path. In fact, it is not even a proper path because it maps only
to the angles 0°and 180°.
A way out of this problem is to consider the direction of paths, so
that the relation of betweenness is restricted to paths that have the
same direction. If we make this restriction, polar betweenness can also
be defined for “around,” and it can then be shown to be convex.
6. DOMAINS OF PREPOSITIONS
The second part of the single-domain thesis about prepositions concerns
their domains. The traditional semantic approach to prepositions is that
they express spatial relations. For example, Leibniz (1765, chap. 3, §1)
writes that prepositions “are all taken from space, distance and move-
ment, and then transferred to all sorts of changes, orders, sequences,
differences.” This localist view has then been a main trend in linguistics
(Miller & Johnson-Laird 1976; Jackendoff 1983; Landau & Jackendoff
1993; Herskovits 1986; Zwarts & Winter 2000). When combined with
nonspatial words, they create a spatially structured mental represen-
tation of the expression. For example, Herskovits (1986) presents an
elaborate study of the fundamental spatial meanings of prepositions,
and she argues that the spatial structure is transferred by metaphorical
transformations to other contexts.
However, although the localist program has been successful for most
locative and directional prepositions, recent analyses of prepositions
have indicated that domains other than the visuospatial domain may
be central for the meaning of some prepositions. First of all, there exist
prepositions that refer to the temporal domain. In English, the clearest
examples are “before” and “after.” (The convexity of their temporal re-
gions is immediate.) Etymologically, these words have a spatial origin,
but they are now used primarily for the temporal domain. The spatial
meanings have been taken over by “in front of” and “behind.”
How can it be ascertained that the proper domain for “before” and
“after” is the time dimension and not a spatial dimension? First note
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that all four prepositions are invariant under multiplication of the un-
derlying dimension. There is, however, an asymmetry between “after”
and “behind” in the following examples:
(1) She is behind me in the queue, but if I turn around she is in
front of me.
(2) *She is after me in the queue, but if I turn around she is before
me.
These examples show that a reversal of spatial orientation changes the
preposition “behind” to its opposite “in front of.” However, a spatial
reversal does not change the temporal ordering from “before” to “after.”
This means that the meanings of “before” and “after” allow some spatial
rotations, which is evidence that the prepositions are not based on the
spatial domain.5 As I will show, this argument concerning rotations can
be generalized.
7. A FORCE-DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF IN, ON, AND AGAINST
Several authors have proposed that the meanings of many prepositions
include a force-dynamic component (Dewell 1994; Bowerman 1996;
Garrod et al. 1999; Tyler & Evans 2001; Zwarts 2010; Bëlien 2002).
I begin by considering the domains of “in” and “on.”
I will use force vectors to analyze the dynamic aspects of these
prepositions, although I cannot work out this idea in as much detail as
the locative and directional prepositions, because the domain of forces
is much more complex. Mathematically, what is needed here is the no-
tion of a force field, that is, a space with a force vector associated with
each point of that space. In most practical situations, such a force field
would almost always involve gravitation as a component (this force has
direction θ = 180°). However, force fields may be extremely complex
depending on the relations between the landmark and the trajectory,
and it is therefore difficult to give a general analysis based on them.
Herskovits (1986) noted that the pear in Figure 9a is considered
to be in the bowl even though it is not spatially inside the bowl. If
the apples are removed, but the pear is left in exactly the same spatial
position as in Figure 9b, then the pear is no longer in the bowl. So
spatial location is not sufficient to determine whether an object is in a
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bowl. In Figure 9a, the reason why the pear is in the bowl is that it is
physically supported by the apples, while in 9b it has no such support.
The notion of “support” clearly involves forces.
Figure 9. (a) The pear is in the bowl. (b) The pear is not in the bowl
(from Garrod et al. 1999, p. 168).
Vandeloise (1986, pp. 222–224) analyzes the French dans (in) in
terms of containment, which he describes as a functional relation re-
lated to the notion of “carrier” (porteur) in that the container “controls”
the position of the contained, but not conversely (p. 229). Similarly,
the position of Garrod et al. (1999) is that if x is in y, then y’s location
“controls” x in the sense that the container y “constrains” the location
of x (p. 173). They do not, however, specify what is meant by “con-
strains.” Also Zwarts (2010, p. 209) writes that in “involves a passive
and stative configuration of forces, not necessarily involving contact.”
I propose that containment can be expressed as a counterfactual
constraint based on forces: if the trajector were perturbed, it would still
be controlled by forces exerted by the landmark. This condition clearly
separates the situation in Figure 9a from that of 9b. I submit that this
constraint captures the basic meaning of “in,” and consequently the
central meaning of the preposition is based on the force domain. In
most cases, this can be replaced by a simpler condition: if the land-
mark moves, so does the trajector. Clearly this is not the whole story
about “in” and containment because it does not distinguish it from “on”
and support. Coventry, Carmichael, and Garrod (1994) and Feist and
Gentner (1998) show that the concavity of the landmark plays a role.
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Subjects prefer “in” for dishes and “on” for plates.
As mentioned earlier, a general analysis of convexity in terms of the
forces involved in the meaning of “in” is extremely complicated. How-
ever, for situations of objects in containers, such as apples in a bowl,
the force patterns involved would, in general, support the convexity of
“in.” I will not give a more detailed analysis.
Furthermore, because the forces controlling the figure have a spatial
location, it is difficult to totally disentangle the force domain from the
visuospatial domain and verify that only the force domain determines
the meaning of “in.” To be sure, there are examples where “in” is used
purely spatially without any forces involved as in (3) and (4). One
could view these as metonymic extensions of the central meaning of
“in.” In many of these cases, both “in” and the purely spatial “inside”
can be used (e.g., “in the box,” “inside the box”). There are, however,
cases where only “inside” can be used:
(3) The airplane is in the cloud.
(4) Oscar is in the middle of the room.
(5) inside the border, inside the city limits, inside the door
(6) *in the border, *in the city limits, *in the door
In (5) “inside” seems to take a boundary as its landmark and refer
to a region at one of the two sides of the boundary. In contrast to
“in,” then, “inside” is much more like the “axial” prepositions such as
“behind” and “above” and hence clearly a spatial preposition.
Another example is illustrated in Figure 10. In Figure 10a, the
movements of the duck are controlled by the movements of the tube,
and according to the proposed criterion, it is appropriate to describe the
situation as that the duck is in the ring. In contrast, Figure 10b shows
a situation where the movements of the duck are less constrained by
those of the tube, and consequently it is less appropriate to say that the
duck is in the tube. It is more felicitous to say that the duck is inside or
within the tube, since “inside” and “within” are prepositions that refer
to the spatial domain.6
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Figure 10. (a) A duck in a tube. (b) A duck not in a tube.
To measure the container’s degree of control on the trajectory x, we
can define the function in(x) by saying that in(x) = d if d is the average
distance that the container is perturbed before x changes position. In
Figure 10a, in(duck) = 0, since the duck moves as soon as the tube is
perturbed. However, in Figure 10b, in(duck) is the average distance of
the duck from the sides of the tube, which is greater than zero.7 Simi-
larly, in Figure 9a, in(pear) = 0, but in(pear) =∞ in Figure 9b, if the
container is imagined to move only in the horizontal dimensions.
For the preposition “on,” the semantic representation involves con-
tact and support from below. A spatial region is not sufficient to deter-
mine the meaning of “on.” In brief, I propose that the meaning of “x is
on y” is that the force vector from x makes x come in contact with y, and
a counterforce from y balances the force vector of x. Typically, the force
vector pointing from the figure x is generated by gravitation. (Just as
with “in,” the meaning of “on” also involves counterfactual control: x
is on the table means that if the table were to move, so would x.)
How can it be established that the basic domain of “on” is the force
domain? This is a problem because, in typical cases, the role of forces
is not noted when “on” is applied. The reason is that the gravitational
force is like the drone of bagpipe music: it is always there and normally
not attended to. However, in other situations, the force dynamics are
more transparent. Figure 11 illustrates a situation where the spatial
relation involved in typical uses of “on” can be contrasted with the force-
dynamic meaning of the preposition. The lamp is vertically above the
balloon and in contact with it, which are the normal spatial conditions
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proposed for the meaning of “on.” Nevertheless it is odd to say that the
lamp is on the balloon. As a matter of fact, it might be more natural to
say that the balloon is on the lamp or against the lamp, since the lifting
force from the balloon makes it come into contact with the lamp (if the
lamp moves, so does the balloon, but not conversely). In this example,
the directions of the forces involved are the opposite of what is typical.
Figure 11. Is the lamp on the balloon?
The same principle applies to, for example, “the painting is on the
wall,” “the Band-Aid is on the leg,” and “the button is on the shirt.”
What is crucial in examples of this type is that there is a force that acts
on the trajector that makes it remain in contact with the landmark,
not the spatial direction of the trajectory in relation to the landmark.
In the case of the painting on the wall, it is still gravitation that acts
on the trajector, but now the hanging mechanism makes the painting
exert a pressure in the direction of the wall. These examples support the
claim that only the force domain is necessary to determine the meaning
of “on.” More generally, this can be expressed by saying that “on” is
invariant under spatial rotation as long as the force relations stay the
same. As we have seen before, this provides evidence that the meaning
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of “on” depends on the force domain and not the spatial domain.8
Regarding the convexity of “on,” the situation for the horizontal di-
mensions is relatively clear: if x and y are on an extended landmark u
that is itself convex, and z is between x and y, then z is also on u, under
the assumption that the force field operating on x and y toward u is
convex, so that it also operates on z. However, there is also a “vertical”
sense of convexity (“vertical” in relation to the direction of the force).
For example, if a book is on a table and a plate is on the book, then
one can say that the plate is also on the table. This form of transitivity
is limited to horizontally extended objects, though: if an apple is on a
table and the stem is on the apple, then we do not infer that the stem
is on the table. Nevertheless, if x is on u, and y, which is above x, is
also on u, then any object between x and y is also on u. In brief, “on”
satisfies the convexity requirement if the relevant landmarks and force
field have the required convexity properties.
Some authors speak of a functional analysis of prepositions rather
than a force-dynamic one (Vandeloise 1986; Coventry et al. 1994; Gar-
rod et al. 1999; Coventry et al. 2001; McIntyre 2007). I suggest that
most of the functions used in these analyses can be reduced to forces
or force patterns. For example, Garrod et al. (1999, pp. 173–174)
defines the notion of a landmark y functionally supporting a trajector
x as follows: “y’s location controls the location of x with respect to a
unidirectional force (by default gravity) by virtue of some degree of
contact between x and y.” They next say that if x is on y, then y func-
tionally supports x. In terms of forces, this can be expressed by saying
that gravitation (or some other force) presses x toward y, and the fric-
tion between x and y makes x move whenever y moves. Their analysis
is congruent with the one presented here, though they do not explic-
itly mention the force domain and its geometric structure as a separate
domain.
“Against” is perhaps the clearest example of a preposition that is
based on the force domain (Zwarts 2010):
(7) Oscar bumped against the wall.
Zwarts (2010, p. 194) notes that “against” “combines with verbs like
crash, lean, push, bang, and rest, verbs that all involve forces.” In the
typical case, such as (7), the trajector follows a more or less horizontal
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path and exerts a force on a landmark. There are, however, also static
uses of “against” where the path is reduced to a point (endpoint focus
transformation):
(8) The ladder leans against the house.
Furthermore, in this case too the direction can be changed by a rotation:
(9) Standing on the wooden stairs, Oscar pressed his shoulders against
the cellar flap, but he could not open it.
In (9) the direction of the force is vertical. Again, this suggests that
“against” is invariant to rotational spatial transformations.
Bowerman and her colleagues (Bowerman & Pedersen 1992; Bow-
erman 1996; Bowerman & Choi 2001) analyze aan, op, and in in Dutch,
as well as the Korean prepositional verbs nehta (put loosely, in or around)
and kkita (fit tightly in). The analysis involves force components that
cannot be reduced to spatial relations. Bowerman and Choi (2001)
present a semantic map containing five steps that is divided into differ-
ent areas by different prepositions in different languages.
8. OVER AS A FORCE RELATION
Within the tradition of cognitive semantics, the preposition “over” has
been studied over and over again, beginning with Brugman (1981),
then expanded by Lakoff ((1987) and partly reanalyzed by, for example,
Vandeloise (1986), Dewell (1994), Kreitzer (1997), Tyler and Evans
(2001), Zlatev (2003), and Belien (2008).
Coventry et al. (2001) propose that what distinguishes “over/under”
from the purely spatial “above/below” is that “over/under” has a func-
tional meaning. They showed subjects, for example, pictures of people
wearing umbrellas protecting them with more or less success against
the rain. Their results suggest that the use of “above/below” is deter-
mined by spatial relations, while “over/under” is sensitive to functional
relations, for example, whether the umbrella is protecting a person from
rain falling in a slanted direction. I agree that Coventry et al. (2001)
are on the right track, but instead I would argue that “over” has a cen-
tral meaning that is based on a relation in the force domain (see also
Coseriu 2003; Van der Gucht et al. 2007; Bëlien 2008).
www.thebalticyearbook.org
Geometry of Preposition Meanings 24
A common assumption in the kinds of lexical analyses performed
in cognitive linguistics is that a word or an expression has a prototypi-
cal meaning, which can then be extended by different transformations.
Brugman’s (1981) and Lakoff’s (1987) central image schema for “over”
is depicted in Figure 12. The content of the schema can be formulated
entirely in terms of spatial dimensions as the trajector (TR) moving
horizontally in a position vertically higher than a landmark (LM). A
prototypical example is the following:
(10) The bird flies over the yard.
On this account, over typically describes a kinematic scene (in contrast
to above which is stative).
Figure 12: The central image schema for over according to Lakoff
(1987, p. 426).
Starting from this central schema, Lakoff then identifies twenty-four
different senses of “over” that are connected to each other in radial net-
work. Most of these senses can be described as elaborations (Holmqvist
1993) or superimpositions, where the different elements of the schema
are further specified. I do not count such elaborations as alternative
meanings of “over”; they are just specializations of other meanings.
Tyler and Evans (2001) are more systematic, and they present criteria
for when two meanings of a word are different. Nevertheless they end
up with fourteen different meanings of “over.” Most of these can be gen-
erated from the central schema, just as in the case of Lakoff’s meanings,
by metaphorical and metonymical transformations.
Instead I want to argue in favor of a minimal specification of the
meaning of “over.” The crucial point concerning minimal specification
versus full specification is that the semantics of a word must be sep-
arated from its role in a construal underlying a particular composite
expression. Here I follow Fauconnier (1990, p. 400), who writes: “The
‘semantics’ of a language expression is the set of constraints it imposes
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on cognitive constructions; this is a structural property, which is inde-
pendent of context” (for a similar position, see Coseriu 2003). When
several words are put together in a phrase or sentence, their constraints
are combined in the cognitively most efficient manner. If the constraints
are incompatible, a metaphorical or metonymical transformation is re-
quired to close the meaning gap. The different kinds of combinations
of constraints will result in a variety of construals that may give the
impression that a particular word is polysemous.
In contrast to most previous analyses, I therefore maintain that there
is a single central meaning of “over” from which the other meanings
are generated by various combinations and transformations. Dewell
(1994) argues that the central meaning of “over” should be described
as the trajector taking a semicircular path in relation to the landmark,
as in Figure 13.
Figure 13: The central image schema for over according to Dewell
(1994, p. 353).
The semicircular structure includes the feature that the trajector
moves up and down along a path. In typical cases, the vertical di-
mension is associated with a gravitational force. Although Dewell only
marginally considers the force relations, adding gravitation to the ver-
tical axis entails that moving up along this dimension involves a force
that is strong enough to overcome gravitation. I therefore propose that
the central meaning of “over” is the schema in Figure 13, but including
a force-dynamic element in the description of the path. In many cases,
the countergravitational force is exerted by the trajector itself (e.g., “the
bird flies over the yard”). Just as for “on,” the basic domain for “over” is
therefore the force domain. In contrast to “on,” the central meaning of
“over” involves a path and no contact between trajector and landmark.
For “in” and “on,” it is also assumed that the force of the trajectory is
balanced by a counterforce from the landmark, but for “over” the forces
of the landmark do not seem to play a role. Then, since force dynamics
naturally lead to changes in spatial position, “over” generates a lot of
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implicatures for the visuospatial domain, but still, the force dynamics
are primary.
Regarding the convexity of the meaning of “over,” this again de-
pends on how betweenness relations for force vectors and paths are
defined. I will not go into the details of an analysis.
A similar force-dynamic analysis of Dutch over is presented by Be-
lien (2008). She describes the central constraint as follows: “Over des-
ignates a relation between a trajector and a landmark in which the tra-
jector is related to the landmark by a mental path that follows a surface
of the landmark, and from which a force points to the landmark” (p.
49). The central component here is that “over” involves a force that is
directed toward the landmark. The situation is parallel to that of “on”
and “in.” Just as for “on” and “in,” the primacy of the force domain can
be exhibited by considering spatial rotations of the basic scheme.
In the schema in Figure 13, the canonical direction for “over” is the
vertical dimension, determined by gravitation. In some cases, one finds
transformations of the canonical direction:
(11) Victoria wears a veil over her face.
(12) Victoria held her hands over her eyes.
In both (11) and (12), the landmark is the face, and its canonical di-
rection is transformed into the vertical dimension. In example (11),
it is still gravitation that acts on the trajector, but now the fastening
of the veil makes it exert a pressure in the horizontal direction toward
the face. And in example (12), it is Victoria herself who exerts a force
of her hand in the horizontal direction. From this perspective on the
forces involved, the veil and the hands are over the face.9
Other force directions can be involved as well:
(13) The fly is crawling over the ceiling.
In this example, the ceiling is the landmark, upside down in relation to
the normal ground, but again over the ceiling in relation to the forces
exerted on the trajector, the fly. The role of gravitation is downplayed,
since it is overcome by the forces that make the fly’s feet stick to the
ceiling.
(14) Oscar nailed a board over the hole in the ceiling.
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In this example, the nailing creates an upward force that makes the
trajector (the board) be directed toward the landmark (the ceiling). So
in examples (13) and (14) the prevalent force is directed vertically up-
ward, which is yet another example of invariance under spatial rotation
(further examples are found in Coventry et al. 2001). The upshot is that
the invariance of “over” under visuospatial rotational transformations
strongly suggests that the force domain is primary for the meaning of
“over.”
I next give some examples of the transformations involved in adapt-
ing the central meaning of “over” (Figure 13) to different construals.
Dewell (1994, p. 355) points out that Lakoff’s schema (Figure 12) can
be seen as a special case of his where the central region is profiled. This
example brings up a first type of semantic transformation: profiling a
segment of a schema (this can be seen as a special case of the metonymy
operation). For example, in “The bird flew over the yard,” the central
part of the bird’s flying path is attended to. In contrast, in “Sam fell
over the cliff,” the downward part of the trajector is put in focus; and
in “The plane climbed high over the city,” the focus is on the upward
part of the trajector (p. 356). The profiling is not arbitrary, however;
Dewell argues that a constraint for “over” is that the profiled segments
must include the peak point of the arc (p. 355).
A special case of a profiling transformation is endpoint focus. In “[the
city of] Sausalito is over the bridge” (Lakoff, 1987, p. 424), Sausalito is
not moving vertically above the Golden Gate Bridge, but the speaker’s
inner gaze makes a “fictive motion” (Talmy 1996) from San Francisco
over the bridge to Sausalito. Focusing on the endpoint is a pars pro
toto metonymy. This case can be seen as a counterexample to Dewell’s
constraint that the peak point must be included. Admittedly, it engages
another type of transformation.
The central meaning of “over” both involves a path (located verti-
cally higher than the landmark) and requires that the trajector not be
in contact with the landmark. In English, both these components can
be modified by transformations:
(15) The car drives over the bridge (contact).
(16) The painting hangs over the fireplace (no path).
However, the two transformations cannot be combined. For example,
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a painting that is over the fireplace but in contact with it will be said
to be on the fireplace, since the scene then fulfills the requirements
for the basic meaning of “on.” Dewell (1994, p. 373) notes that when
“over” involves contact, it is distinguished from “on” by involving a path
(which can be a result of mental scanning) and by the trajector (or its
path) covering the landmark (as in (15)).
Endpoint focus can be applied not only to spatial phenomena but
also to processes. In “The play is over” (Lakoff, 1987, p. 439), the play is
construed as an extended event that creates a path in time. If the end of
the path is focused, the play has gone over this path. Thus this example
has the same structure as “Sausalito is over the bridge,” except that the
relevant domain for the endpoint focus is time, not space. Note that
the use of “over” in “The play is over” is, consequently, metaphorical
since the horizontal dimension is changed to the time dimension. “Over
again” involves repeating an event and traversing the path repeatedly.
Finally, a few words about “under.” In many respects, this prepo-
sition behaves like a complement to “over,” though the force-dynamic
features of “under” are different in some situations (see also Coventry et
al., 2001). In contrast to “below,” which has its meaning in the spatial
domain, “under” indicates some dynamic interaction between trajector
and landmark. McIntyre (2007, p. 2) gives the following example:
(17) I washed it under/*below the shower.
However, I will not pursue the details of the analysis.
9. CONCLUSION
The main thesis of this article is that prepositions represent convex sets
of points or paths in a single domain. By using polar coordinates to
define betweenness, I have shown that both locational and directional
prepositions in general fulfill the convexity criterion.
Regarding the thesis about a single domain, my claim is that many
prepositions, traditionally believed to express spatial relations, involve
force dynamics in their central meanings. A still unresolved question
is whether the core meanings of, for example, “on,” “in,” and “over”
can be expressed in the force domain only or their basic semantics also
requires the visuospatial domain. For example, “over” and “against”
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both involve paths in their core meanings, but this is a path that is
associated with a force field.
One preposition that I have not considered is “at.” It is related to the
spatial “by” and “toward,” but examples indicate that a goal domain is
included in the meaning of “at.” Herskovits (1986) mentions that sitting
at a desk or washing at a sink involves more than just being close to the
desk or the sink. In these cases, there is an intentional component in
being at a place. Similarly, Landau and Jackendoff (1993, p. 231) point
out that throwing a ball toward someone is different from throwing a
ball at someone. In the latter case, the throwing has an intention of
hitting.
With this caveat concerning “at,” my tentative conclusion is there-
fore that locative and directional prepositions are based on either the
visuospatial domain, the time domain, or the force domain. What com-
plicates matters is that there are many metaphorical uses of preposi-
tions.
Most important, the ordinary locative prepositions can be used in
other domains, for example, “the temperature is above 20°,” “Midsum-
mer is behind us,” “The color of our neighbors’ house is near that of
ours,” “Victoria is working toward her goals.” And, of course, prepo-
sitions based on the force domain can be used metaphorically for the
visuospatial domain. Since the force vectors are also spatially located,
this kind of metaphor is difficult to detect.
Since prepositions, in most languages, form a closed class, new
meanings cannot be introduced easily by an additional word. So when
an expression for a relation within a domain is required, in particular
for domains different from the visuospatial domain or the force do-
main, the most similar prepositional meaning will have to be selected
(cf. Tyler & Evans, 2001, p. 761). Often a metaphorical or metonymi-
cal transformation helps in closing the meaning gap. The context of the
expression adds information too (cf. Tyler & Evans, 2001, p. 762).
The main topic of this article has been the use of geometric no-
tions to describe the semantics of prepositions. Locative and direc-
tional prepositions are prime examples of how meaning is geometrically
structured. I have also shown that locative and directional prepositions
support the general idea that concepts can be represented by convex
regions in the visuospatial domain. In contrast, the force domain is in-
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volved in the meaning of prepositions such as “in,” “on,” “over,” “under,”
and “against.” Since the force fields involved depend to a large extent
on the nature of the trajector and the landmark and their relation, it is
difficult to determine to what extent the meaning of these prepositions
represents convex regions in the force domain or some product space.
This topic merits further investigation.
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Notes
1This article builds on material from Chapter 11 of my book The Geometry of Meaning:
Semantics Based on Coanceptual Spaces (Gärdenfors 2014). A more elaborate version of
the material in sections 3–6 is can be found in Zwarts and Gardenfors (submitted). I wish
to thank Joost Zwarts for his collaboration on many of these topics. He has drawn several
of the pictures.
2In Gärdenfors (2014), I present similar single-domain hypotheses also for adjectives
and verbs.
3See Gärdenfors (2000, Section 3.5) for further details.
4Coventry et al. (1994) suggest that beside involves a functional component, because
subjects judge beside as more appropriate when trajector and landmark are functionally
related, for example, a jug and a glass. If this is the case, then a spatial analysis is not
sufficient.
5Since before and after are invariant under multiplication, then if the prepositions were
based on the spatial domain and they were invariant under rotation, their corresponding
regions would be the full space, as argued earlier.
6However, “inside the ring” is ambiguous, also meaning inside the tube itself.
7 It would be interesting to investigate whether the distinction between the Korean
prepositions kkita (fitting tightly in) and netha (loose inclusion) (Bowerman & Choi
2001) can be expressed as the difference between whether in(x) = 0 or in(x) > 0.
8This example indicates that an analysis of the invariance classes of different preposi-
tion is a strong tool for determining the relevant domains of prepositions.
9This analysis contrasts with that of Lakoff (1987), who analyzes example (14) as a
separate meaning of over, generated by a rotational transformation of the central mean-
ing.
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